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Testimony of U.S. Representative Pete Hoekstra
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Ranking Member
Before the Michigan Senate Judiciary Committee
August 18, 2009

Thank you for inviting me here today to testify on whether terrorists being held at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility should be transferred to the Standish Maximum Correctional Facility or any facility in Michigan for that matter. My position is clear, I strongly oppose bringing hardcore al-Qaeda terrorist leaders to Michigan. I encourage all Michiganders to study this issue closely before making up their minds on whether or not to support the transfer. This decision will impact the security environment in which we live and should not be made for the sake of political expediency. It is a decision that must be made based on all of the relevant facts and therefore I hope that Michigan officials will be granted greater transparency as to why Guantanamo exists, who these terrorists are and what they and their non-detained associates are capable of doing and in some cases have already done after release from Guantanamo.

One of the biggest misperceptions about the Guantanamo Bay detention facility is whether the Bush Administration wanted to keep the facility open versus the current Administration wanting it to close. Let

there be no doubt that the previous administration believed that Guantanamo ought to be closed, but doing so proved extraordinarily problematic given the legal and security ramifications of bringing the detainees to the United States as well as the general reluctance of allies to take some detainees.

On January 22nd, after being in office for only two days, President Obama issued an Executive Order calling for the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detainee facility within one year. On the same day, the President established a Special Task Force to address the issues surrounding the closure and set a 180-day deadline, which came and went last month. What the Task Force and the President is realizing is the same thing that President Bush realized, that closing the detention facility is not only problematic it also is a bad idea.

It is a bad idea because two critical questions have not been answered, and in some cases cannot be answered fully enough to guarantee that the risks to the people of Michigan are acceptable risks. The President's Task Force has refused to brief even the Members of the House Intelligence Committee on its work or to respond to any questions, which should cause significant concern in Michigan that it has developed no good answers to these questions.

Question 1: Why Was Guantanamo Opened, Who Are The Detainees, and What Risks Do They Pose?

The reality is that many of the Guantanamo detainees are committed, hardcore radical jihadists who have sworn a religious oath to kill as many Americans as possible. They are not ordinary criminals, and cannot be treated as ordinary criminals. Here are just a few examples – my descriptions are based on public documents from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. And I can assure you that the classified documents that I have regularly and closely reviewed are even more troubling:

- **Khalid Sheikh Muhammad:** "... is one of history's most infamous terrorists, and his capture in 2003 deprived al-Qaeda of one of its most capable senior operatives. He devoted much of his adult life to terrorist plotting, specifically against the United States, and was the driving force behind the attacks on 11 September 2001 as well as several subsequent plots against U.S. and Western targets worldwide." During his trial at Guantanamo, KSM boasted: "I decapitated with my blessed right hand the head of the American Jew, Daniel Pearl, in the city of Karachi, Pakistan. For those who would like to confirm, there are pictures of me on the Internet holding his head."

- **Ramzi Bin al-Shibh:** "... a key facilitator for the attacks on 11 September 2001, was a lead operative – until his capture in 2002 – in the post-11 September plot ... to hijack aircraft and crash them into Heathrow Airport in the United Kingdom."
- **'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri:** "'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was al-Qaeda's operations chief in the Arabian Peninsula until his capture in 2002. Trained in explosives, Nashiri honed his expertise in suicide attacks and maritime operations. He led cells in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen, and he was the mastermind and local manager of the bombing in October 2000 of the USS Cole."

The majority of the remaining detainees at Guantanamo are the hardest of the hardcore terrorists. They were al-Qaeda's senior leadership, and they planned and recruited followers to carry out attacks that killed thousands of Americans and would have killed thousands more if not for our successful efforts to stop them. If the objective of moving the remaining, hardcore, detainees to the United States is to "rehabilitate" these committed jihadists, it will almost certainly fail. In January, Saudi Arabia arrested nine "graduates" of its rehabilitation program – some of whom had been imprisoned at Guantanamo - for rejoining terrorist groups since the program started in 2004. Recidivism

among former Guantanamo inmates has become a significant concern. It has been publicly reported that former Guantanamo detainee Said Ali al-Shihiri had been named the Deputy Commander of al-Qaeda in Yemen and may have been involved in car bombings against the U.S. Embassy that killed 16 people, including one young American citizen. Two other former Guantanamo detainees appeared in a YouTube video on the internet with rifles and grenades threatening the United States.

And in April, the Department of Defense issued a fact sheet suggesting that as many as 14 percent of former Guantanamo detainees have been confirmed or suspected as reengaging in terrorist activities. And let me emphasize that the issue here should not be about quibbling over exactly how many may or may not have returned to terrorism – we have to make every effort to prevent 100% of potential attacks. It is incontrovertible that former detainees have returned to the fight, sometimes carrying out significant attacks. An 86% passing grade is simply not acceptable when it comes to protecting American lives. If they will do it overseas, they will certainly do it within our country if brought to America.

Question 2: What are the Implications of Bringing Terrorists into the United States?

Guantanamo was not chosen as a detention location for mere symbolism – there are significant practical and legal advantages to a facility outside the United States, that immediately become significant disadvantages and problems in Michigan.

- **Escape:** Despite the excellent record of the Bureau of Prisons, al-Qaeda terrorists are a determined enemy with a record of escaping from detention that must be considered as part of any decision to bring detainees to the United States. Just last December, three suspected members of al-Qaeda in Iraq reportedly broke out of prison in Ramadi, killing six police officers and seven prisoners. In 2005, Omar al-Faruq, “one of al-Qaeda’s most senior global operatives,” was one of four prisoners who reportedly escaped from a heavily-guarded U.S. military prison in Afghanistan. Even with our best efforts, the threat of escape will be real and significant.
- **Protection of Detention Personnel:** Guantanamo inmates are currently guarded by American military personnel who cannot readily be identified by detainees. Moving them to American prisons poses significant additional risks to corrections personnel, their families, and their communities. Just as importantly, the

facilities could themselves become prominent targets for terrorist attacks. All of this would directly impact the people of Michigan.

- **Access to Visitors and Radicalization of Prisons:** Terrorist detainees are now held in carefully controlled conditions that offer only tightly and carefully controlled interaction with other detainees and with outsiders such as legal counsel. Inside the United States, terrorist detainees would inevitably have significantly greater opportunities to command and control their networks through outsiders and to spread radical jihadist ideology. Even a prisoner in “Supermax” is entitled to five visits per month of up to seven hours each – it makes little to no sense to facilitate even monitored al-Qaeda communications. Radical Attorney Lynne Stewart was convicted for relaying coded messages from World Trade Center bomber Abdul Rahman to his terrorist followers obtained during legal visits in the United States.
- **Legal Issues:** There are several legal distinctions between detainees housed abroad and in the United States. Most notably, detainees brought to United States territory could seek legal immigration status through political asylum claims, and could be released inside the United States if they are acquitted or unable to be prosecuted. In addition, the United States could be required to

provide hostile foreign governments with consular access to terrorist detainees held within the United States. Would we really want foreign spies from these governments coming to Michigan to visit prisoners who are held here?

Michiganders Must Have an Informed Role Prior to Any Transfer

It is unacceptable for the federal government to force its solutions that fail to answer these questions to the people of Michigan in order to excuse the hasty decision-making of the President on this issue. That's why Congress has already shown bipartisan concern over bringing Guantanamo detainees into the United States. I and many other members of the U.S. House of Representatives have supported the Keep Terrorists Out of America Act, HR 2294, which I co-sponsored with Republican leader John Boehner.

I worked with Leader Boehner to craft what I believe is the most important section of the bill, dealing with information that should be provided to State Governments to ensure an informed role, as well to require approval by the state prior to any transfer. The bill would:

- First, require the President to submit to the governor and state legislature a certification that any individual to be transferred does

not pose a security risk to the United States, and receive the consent of the Governor and State legislature to any transfer, and

- Second, submit the following information to the states along with such a certification:
 - The name of any individual to be released;
 - The location and installation to which the person will be transferred;
 - A justification for why that location was selected;
 - The findings of an analysis carried out by the President describing any risk to the national security of the United States or the residents of the United States (or any state) that is posed by the transfer;
 - A certification that any such risk has been mitigated;
 - A certification that any transfer will not adversely affect the ability to prosecute any detainee and the findings of that analysis;
 - A certification that any transfer will not adversely affect the ability to detain any individual in question, and the findings of that analysis; and
 - A certification that any transfer will not result in the release into the United States of any individual in question and the findings of that analysis.

This is just the minimum information that should be provided to the states that would be directly impacted. As the Ranking Member of the House Intelligence Committee, I have also reviewed a substantial amount of classified information about the threats posed by detainees. More of this information must be declassified and made public. I sponsored two amendments to this year's Intelligence Authorization bill that will require more public reporting about recidivism by released detainees, as well as more information about the Uighur detainees who have already been released to third countries.

There is also substantial additional information that should be declassified and shared with the state legislature and the people of Michigan. While we have to protect our intelligence sources and methods and we have to be careful not to tell al-Qaeda exactly what we do know about them and how we know it, I strongly support bringing every piece of information that it is possible to release to the attention of the people of Michigan so they can make a full and informed decision on their own future.

In closing, I also suspect there are people in Michigan, including a number of her prominent leaders, who believe that relocating the detainees from Guantanamo to Michigan should be viewed as an

economic decision. Given the reasons I have outlined, I cannot agree with that notion. I will not put a price-tag on the security of Michiganders or on the peace of mind of Michigan families.

Yes, our state may need jobs, but we have to ask ourselves if some jobs are worth the risk and cost? We need state leaders to pursue jobs for the future, the kind of jobs that attract new families and new business investment—in advanced technologies and automotive research, in medicine and science, and in agriculture and tourism, which will surely suffer as the state's reputation is transformed from that of "Pure Michigan" into the terrorist prison peninsula.

I ask each of you on this panel, can you, with a straight face, make the case that locating Gitmo North in Michigan is part of a winning strategy for the state's future. As a former business marketing executive for a Fortune 500 company, I can assert from experience that making Michigan home to the world's most dangerous terrorists will certainly not in any way make it more attractive for tourists, families or potential job providers.

I reiterate my strong opposition to the transfer of hardcore al-Qaeda terrorist leaders to Michigan. No state should be turned into a

dumping ground for rash, unmanageable political decisions made by the Federal Government.

I thank you for the privilege of testifying today and this concludes my formal remarks.

NAME	'Ali 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Ali
PHONETICS	ah-Lee ahbd-al-ah-ZEEZ ah-LEE
KEY ALIAS	'Ammar al-Baluchi
AFFILIATION	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Baluchi born and raised in Kuwait

Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida operative 'Ammar al-Baluchi is a member of an extended family of extremists that has spawned such notorious terrorists as his detained uncle and 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) and cousin and incarcerated World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef. 'Ammar served as a key lieutenant for KSM during the operation on 11 September and subsequently assisted his uncle on various plots against the United States and United Kingdom.

'Ammar, who is 29 years old, spent most of his teen years in Iran before moving to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to work as a computer programmer in Dubai in 1998. Even before this move, he was gradually being influenced by his extremist relatives to become involved in terrorism; his chief mentor was Ramzi Yousef, who taught him in the early 1990s in Iran about the importance of war against the West. 'Ammar volunteered his services to KSM in 1997, and during 2000-2001 played an important role helping facilitate the operation on 11 September by transferring money to US-based operatives and acting as a travel facilitator to hijackers transiting the UAE on their way from Pakistan to the United States.

After the collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2001, 'Ammar assisted KSM in organizing the movement of al-Qa'ida operatives and their families to safehouses in Pakistan. KSM also directed him at the forefront of planning for a variety of terrorist plots against the West, including:

- In late 2001 in Afghanistan, KSM directed 'Ammar to be the communications intermediary between al-Qa'ida and "shoe bombers" Richard Reid and Saajid Badat. In early 2002 in Pakistan, 'Ammar helped KSM prepare operatives for travel to the United States, ostensibly to carry out attacks.
- During 2002-2003 'Ammar also worked with KSM to prepare Majid Khan and others for travel to the United States to conduct terrorist operations. 'Ammar also sent Khan in late 2002 to Thailand to deliver \$50,000 to finance plotting by Jemaah Islamiya leader Hambali against US and Israeli targets in Southeast Asia.
- From late 2002, 'Ammar began plotting to carry out simultaneous attacks in Karachi against the US Consulate, Western residences, and Westerners at the local airport. After KSM's detention, 'Ammar assumed responsibility for the plot to carry out hijacking attacks from Heathrow Airport but decided to delay that plot until after the bombings in Karachi occurred. He was within days of completing preparations for the Karachi plot when he was captured.
- In 2002, 'Ammar directed Aafia Siddiqui—a US-educated neuroscientist and al-Qa'ida facilitator—to travel to the United States to prepare paperwork to ease Majid Khan's deployment to the United States. 'Ammar married Siddiqui shortly before his detention.

NAME	Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani
PHONETICS	geh-LAH-nee
KEY ALIAS(ES)	Haytham al-Kini
AFFILIATION(S)	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Tanzanian

An al-Qa'ida document forger and travel facilitator, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani—known in al-Qa'ida circles as Haytham al-Kini—rose in stature after 11 September 2001 to become one of al-Qa'ida's top forgers. Although Ghailani was not directly involved in operational planning, he worked for the now-deceased Hamza Rabi'a—then al-Qa'ida's chief of external operations—and forged or altered passports for many al-Qa'ida members. Most of his work involved substituting photos in passports and modifying visa stamps.

- Ghailani lived at various houses in North and South Waziristan in 2003 and 2004, which in conjunction with his forgery work, allowed him to meet many high- and low-level al-Qa'ida operatives.

Ghailani, born around 1974 in Zanzibar, Tanzania, is one of the FBI's Most Wanted terrorists and has been indicted for his role in the East Africa Embassy bombings on 7 August 1998. Ghailani, who knew many of the Africans involved in the attacks, originally met one of the operatives, Fahid Muhammad Ali Msalem, through a mutual friend; he later befriended the rest of the group after he began traveling between Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Mombasa, Kenya, transporting and selling various items and doing odd jobs. Msalem asked Ghailani at various times to help the group purchase a truck, gas cylinders, and TNT that would later be used to construct a car bomb, requests Ghailani fulfilled.

- Ghailani and several other operatives moved to Afghanistan—which Ghailani had wanted to do for several years—the day before the Embassy bombings.
- After arriving in Afghanistan, Ghailani attended regular training at one of al-Qa'ida's camps and served as a rank-and-file soldier. Ghailani eventually became a cook for Usama Bin Ladin before joining a group of fellow Africans in 2001 who ran al-Qa'ida's document forgery office in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- Ghailani fled to Karachi, Pakistan, after the fall of the Taliban, but high-profile arrests in Karachi in April 2003 convinced him to move to South Waziristan.

NAME	Hambali
PHONETICS	HAM-bali
KEY ALIAS(ES)	Riduan bin Isomuddin (true name), Encep Nurjaman
AFFILIATION(S)	Jemaah Islamiya and al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Born in Indonesia, ethnically Sundanese

Indonesian-born Riduan bin Isomuddin—best known among extremists as Hambali—was an operational mastermind in the Southeast Asia-based Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and also served as the main interface between JI and al-Qa'ida from 2000 until his capture in 2003. Hambali helped plan the first Bali bombings in 2002 that killed more than 200 persons and facilitated al-Qa'ida financing for the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing the following year. In late 2002, he also directed his subordinates Lillie and Zubair to case the British High Commission in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Hambali was previously involved in the attempted assassination of the Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia in August 2000 and the bombings on Christmas Eve that year of some 30 churches across the archipelago. Hambali had longstanding ties to al-Qa'ida external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). Before returning to Southeast Asia in December 2001, Hambali discussed operations with senior al-Qa'ida leaders regarding post-11 September attacks against US interests.

Hambali in 1999 established a cell of young JI operatives in Karachi, Pakistan—dubbed al-Ghuraba—which provided its members with advanced doctrinal and operational training, including at al-Qa'ida training camps in Afghanistan. Hambali tapped his younger brother, Rusman "Gun Gun" Gunawan, as deputy Ghuraba cell leader.

Hambali was born on 4 April 1964 in Cianjur, West Java, and is the eldest male of 11 children. His great-grandfather founded a local Islamic school, which Hambali attended during his early adolescence. Hambali was a devout Muslim youth who, at age 20, left Indonesia for Malaysia, ostensibly to seek work. While there, he met JI cofounders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir—fellow Indonesians who had fled the Suharto regime for Malaysia—and through them was exposed to radical Islamic teachings. Hambali tried unsuccessfully to get a scholarship to an Islamic school in Malaysia, before traveling in the mid-1980s to Afghanistan, where he fought alongside many of al-Qa'ida's future leaders. During his three-year stint in Afghanistan, he forged strong ties to Usama Bin Ladin and KSM. After returning to Malaysia in the early 1990s, Hambali and JI spiritual leader Bashir further developed their relationship and became close friends.

NAME	Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi
PHONETICS	moo-STAH-fah ahl-hah-SOW-ee
KEY ALIAS(ES)	Hashim 'Abd al-Rahman, Zahir, Ayyub, Muhammad Adnan
AFFILIATION(S)	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Saudi

Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi was one of two key financial facilitators entrusted by 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) to manage the funding for the hijackings. As a trusted, respected financial facilitator known to the leadership, al-Hawsawi separately met with Usama Bin Ladin, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Qa'ida spokesman Sulayman Bu Ghayth soon after the attacks on 11 September and had contact with many of al-Qa'ida's most senior managers.

Various reports suggest that al-Hawsawi had direct ties to several of the hijackers and to other operatives, including Ramzi Bin al-Shibh—who delivered some money from al-Hawsawi to the hijackers. In addition, al-Hawsawi and Bin al-Shibh served as a communications link between KSM and the hijackers. He shared a United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based financial account with one hijacker—an account that funded the hijackers' activities in the month before the attacks on 11 September. Four hijackers returned money directly to al-Hawsawi in the week before the attacks, which al-Hawsawi then redeemed in the UAE. Al-Hawsawi also wired thousands of dollars to Bin al-Shibh in the summer of 2001, per KSM's instructions. KSM also maintained his own financial links to al-Hawsawi. In 2001, KSM held a supplemental credit card linked to an al-Hawsawi account based in the UAE.

- Al-Hawsawi worked in the al-Qa'ida media center in Afghanistan from 2000—while it was under the direction of KSM—until he departed for the UAE in early 2001.

After the attacks on 11 September, al-Hawsawi fled the UAE and traveled to Afghanistan and to Pakistan, where he hid until his capture in 2003. KSM reportedly had been providing a safehouse and other logistic support to guarantee al-Hawsawi's security after he arrived in Pakistan.

- Hawsawi facilitated other operatives' travel, including Muhammad al-Qahtani, who was denied entry into the United States in the summer of 2001.
- Hawsawi's close relationship with KSM and the latter's active participation in providing for his security following 11 September suggests Hawsawi was key to KSM's operational team.

NAME	Lillie
PHONETICS	LIL-lee
KEY ALIAS(ES)	Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (true name), Bashir Bin Lep
AFFILIATION(S)	Jemaah Islamiya and al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Malaysian

Malaysian-born Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Bashir Bin Lep)—better known as Lillie—was one of Hambali's key lieutenants and had considerable operational experience. Lillie facilitated the transfer of al-Qa'ida funds used for the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing in 2003 and knew of the Jemaah Islamiya's (JI) targets and plans to launch attacks elsewhere in Southeast Asia. He was involved in 2002 in the JI plot against the British High Commission in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and in mid-2002 cased targets in Bangkok and Pattaya, Thailand, at Hambali's direction. Lillie was particularly interested in the ideas of martyrdom and was slated to be a suicide operative for an al-Qa'ida "second wave" attack targeting Los Angeles. Lillie also had links to now-deceased JI bombmaker Dr. Azahari bin Husin and in 2002 received bombmaking tutorials from Azahari. Lillie spent time in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2000, where he trained at al-Qa'ida's al-Faruq camp in weaponry and explosives. Lillie attended Polytechnic University Malaysia in the mid-1990s, where he earned a degree in architecture.

NAME	Majid Khan
PHONETICS	MAH-jid KAHN
KEY ALIAS(ES)	Yusif
AFFILIATION(S)	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Pakistani

Before his 2003 capture, Pakistani national Majid Khan was an al-Qa'ida operative with direct connections to the United States. In 1996, Khan moved to the United States with his family and settled in Baltimore, Maryland, but never obtained US citizenship. After graduating from high school in 1999, Khan became involved in a local Islamic organization and, in early 2002, returned to Pakistan. In Pakistan, Khan's uncle and cousin, who were al-Qa'ida operatives, introduced Khan to senior al-Qa'ida operational planner Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), who selected Khan as an operative for a possible attack inside the United States. KSM selected Khan because of his excellent English and extensive knowledge of the United States.

- During his stay in the United States, Khan worked at his family's gas station and was, therefore, able to assist KSM with his research into the feasibility of a plan to blow up gas stations in the United States. In support of this plot, Khan attended a training course at which he learned how to construct explosive timing devices.
- KSM further tasked Khan to conduct research on poisoning US water reservoirs and considered Khan for an operation to assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf. In addition, Khan passed a test that KSM orchestrated which showed that Khan was committed to being a suicide operative.
- In the fall of 2002 Khan also delivered money to Zubair, an operative who worked directly for Jemaah Islamiya (JI) leader and al-Qa'ida's South Asia representative Hambali. The money was to support terrorist attacks against Western targets.

Khan and detained al-Qa'ida operative and facilitator 'Ammar al-Baluchi discussed with Uzair Paracha's father, Saifullah, a plan to use the New York office of Saifullah's Karachi-based textile import/export business to smuggle explosives into the United States for use with various al-Qa'ida attacks. Khan also had links to al-Qa'ida operatives and facilitators, most notably, Aafia Siddique, a US-educated neuroscientist and al-Qa'ida facilitator, who assisted Majid with documents to hide his travel to Pakistan from US authorities to reenter the United States.

In early 2003, Khan tapped Uzair Paracha, a US permanent resident alien he met in Pakistan through 'Ammar, to impersonate Khan in the United States to make it appear as if Khan had never left the United States and obtain immigration documents that would enable Khan to illegally reenter. Uzair Paracha was convicted and recently sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in the United States for material support to terrorism.

Khan recommended to KSM that Iyman Faris, a naturalized US citizen, be tasked for an al-Qa'ida operation. In 2003, Faris was convicted and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment in the United States on two counts pertaining to material support to terrorism. In 2002, Faris researched, at KSM's request, suspension bridges in New York and looked into obtaining the tools that would be necessary to cut bridge suspension cables.

NAME	'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
PHONETICS	AHbd al-Rah-HEEM ah-NASH-er-REE
KEY ALIAS(ES)	Abd al-Rahim Hussein Muhammad Abdu (true name), Mullah Bilal, Bilal, Abu Bilal al-Makki, Khalid al-Safani, Amm Ahmad ("Uncle Ahmad")
AFFILIATION(S)	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Saudi National of Yemeni descent

'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was al-Qa'ida's operations chief in the Arabian Peninsula until his capture in 2002. Trained in explosives, Nashiri honed his expertise in suicide attacks and maritime operations. He led cells in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen, and he was the mastermind and local manager of the bombing in October 2000 of the USS Cole. The success of the USS Cole operation appeared to have propelled Nashiri into a role of greater responsibility.

Born in Mecca on 5 January 1965, Nashiri ended his formal education after intermediate school and eventually followed in the footsteps of his uncles and cousins to become an extremist. He participated in Ibn al-Khattab's Chechen and Tajik insurgencies and became a trainer at al-Qa'ida's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan in 1992. After returning from Tajikistan, Nashiri, accompanied by al-Qa'ida operative Khallad bin 'Attash, first met Usama Bin Ladin in 1994. In 1997, Nashiri fought with the Taliban in Kabul and Jalalabad. The following year, Nashiri and his cousin, Jihad Muhammad Abu Ali, were implicated in a Bin Ladin-sponsored operation to smuggle Sagger missiles into Saudi Arabia for use against an unspecified US military target. Nashiri was the leader of the plot and a major player in the Saudi cell at that time.

Nashiri was tasked by Bin Ladin in a private meeting in Afghanistan in 1998 to attack a US or Western oil tanker off the coast of Yemen. This original objective was subsequently modified by Bin Ladin in 1999 to target a US military ship in the Port of Aden. Nashiri's operatives' first attempt was unsuccessful when their boat laden with explosives sank in January 2000—they were probably targeting the USS The Sullivans. On Bin Ladin's instructions to try again, his suicide operatives successfully attacked the USS Cole in October. Nashiri was in Afghanistan at the time of the attack.

At the time of his arrest, Nashiri was arranging funding for a plot to crash a small airplane into the bridge of a Western navy vessel in Port Rashid, UAE, an operation he had hoped to execute in November or December 2002. He also was orchestrating additional attacks, one targeting a US housing compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which he had planned for mid-2003. Nashiri abandoned a plot that he was involved in earlier in 2002 to attack warships in the Strait of Hormuz, but his operatives—on orders from Bin Ladin—in October 2002 rammed the French tanker MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen with a small boat. Other plots that Nashiri was involved in included a car bomb attack against a Saudi military installation at Tabuk aimed at killing US military personnel, attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Gibraltar and Western warships passing through the Port of Dubai, and attacks against land-based targets in Morocco, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Nashiri was convicted and sentenced to death by a Yemeni court, in absentia, for his part in the USS Cole bombing.

NAME	Abu Faraj al-Libi
PHONETICS	AH-boo FAH-raj ahl-LEE-bee
KEY ALIAS(ES)	Mustafa al-'Uzayti (probable true name), Mahfuz, 'Abd al-Hafiz, Abu Hamada, Tawfiq
AFFILIATION	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Libyan

Veteran paramilitary commander and facilitator in the Pakistan-Afghanistan theater Abu Faraj took on more direct operational responsibilities following the arrest in 2003 of former al-Qa'ida external operations chief and 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). He was the organization's general manager subordinate only to Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri beginning in mid-2003, while being heavily involved in financing operatives and their families.

Abu Faraj was a communications conduit for al-Qa'ida managers to Bin Ladin from August 2003 until his capture in 2005. He was the recipient of couriered messages and public statements from Bin Ladin and passed messages to Bin Ladin from both senior lieutenants and rank-and-file members. Some of his work almost certainly required personal meetings with Bin Ladin or Zawahiri, a privilege reserved since 2002 for select members of the group.

Abu Faraj had frequent contact with now-deceased senior operational planner Hamza Rabi'a, and other senior managers involved with al-Qa'ida's external operations and paramilitary efforts. Abu Faraj searched for operatives on Rabi'a's behalf, including those who could travel to the United States for attacks, and he also asked now-deceased al-Qa'ida in Iraq leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi to target US interests outside of Iraq.

- Abu Faraj was suspected of involvement in plots to assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf.
- Abu Faraj served as a trainer in the early 1990s and later helped to administer al-Qa'ida's training camps in Afghanistan.

NAME	Zayn al-'Abidin Abu Zubaydah
PHONETIC	AH-Boo Zoo-BAY-duh
KEY ALIASES	Hani, Tariq
AFFILIATIONS	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Palestinian, raised in Saudi Arabia

Zayn al-'Abidin Abu Zubaydah was a leading extremist facilitator who operated in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region from the mid-1990s. Bin Ladin recruited him to be one of al-Qa'ida's senior travel facilitators following Abu Zubaydah's success in 1996 at securing safe passage of al-Qa'ida members returning from Sudan to Afghanistan. In November 2001, Abu Zubaydah helped smuggle now-deceased al-Qa'ida in Iraq leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and some 70 Arab fighters out of Kandahar, Afghanistan, into Iran.

- At the time of his capture, Abu Zubaydah was trying to organize a terrorist attack in Israel and he had enlisted the help of Zarqawi in finding a smuggling route into Israel for moving persons and materials.
- Although not believed to be directly linked to the attacks on 11 September 2001, the \$50,000 that Abu Zubaydah received from Saudi donors and passed to al-Qa'ida's senior leadership for his Israel plot may have been used for the attacks. Moreover, three of the hijackers received basic training at al-Qa'ida's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, which was part of the "Khaldan group" of camps and guesthouses that he oversaw between 1995 and 2000.

Abu Zubaydah's early work as an extremist facilitator in the mid-1990s focused on recruiting Arabs in Pakistan and arranging their travel for various training camps in Afghanistan and the frontlines of Bosnia and Chechnya. Between 1994 and early 2000, he often smuggled both persons and chemicals—such as cyanide and nitrates for use by al-Qa'ida in making weapons—from Pakistan into Afghanistan. He learned document forgery and trained in explosives at the Khaldan camp, where he advanced to become instructor and then administrative director. In his role as a senior mujahidin facilitator and Khaldan camp director, he assisted Western-based trained extremists, including Americans.

- Abu Zubaydah established a document forgery network in Pakistan that supported al-Qa'ida and other extremist groups. In the late 1990s, he procured funds from donors in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which he doled out to various contacts in Pakistan-based extremist networks for their terrorist activities.
- Abu Zubaydah also assisted US Millennium Plot operative Ahmad Ressam to enter Afghanistan to attend a training camp in the late 1990s and to travel to Canada via the United States at the end of 1998. He facilitated the travel and training of the Jordanian cell that was involved in Jordan's Millennium Plot.

NAME	Ramzi Bin al-Shibh
PHONETICS	Rahm-zee bihn-uhl-SHEEB
KEY ALIASES	Abu Ubaydah, 'Umar Muhammad 'Abdallah Ba' Amar
AFFILIATION	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Yemeni

Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, a key facilitator for the attacks on 11 September 2001, was a lead operative—until his capture in 2002—in the post-11 September plot conceived of by 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) to hijack aircraft and crash them into Heathrow Airport in the United Kingdom.

Bin al-Shibh was born in 1972 in southern Yemen. He noted that he was religious from the age of 12 and fought briefly in Yemen's civil war in 1994. After two attempts to immigrate to the United States failed, Bin al-Shibh traveled to Germany, where he applied for political asylum under an assumed name and as a Sudanese citizen. Denied his request for asylum in January 1996, he left Germany and returned to Yemen, where he applied for a visa in his true name. In December 1997, he returned to Germany, where he became a student. In Hamburg, he met hijackers Muhammad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah.

Bin al-Shibh, Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah traveled to Afghanistan in 1999. In Afghanistan, the four men met Usama Bin Ladin, pledged their loyalty to him, and readily accepted Bin Ladin's proposal to martyr themselves in an operation against the United States. Bin al-Shibh was slated to be one of the 11 September hijacker pilots. He and Atta traveled to Karachi, where they met with KSM.

- After returning to Germany in early 2000, Bin al-Shibh obtained a new passport but was unable to obtain a US visa, despite four attempts. Bin al-Shibh said that in late 2000 he tried to convince a US citizen in San Diego via e-mail to marry him to gain entry into the United States, but Atta convinced him to abandon the idea.

During the eight months before the attacks, Bin al-Shibh was the primary communications intermediary between the hijackers in the United States and al-Qa'ida's leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He relayed orders from al-Qa'ida senior operatives to Atta via e-mail or phone, and he met with Atta in Germany in January 2001 and in Spain in July 2001 for in-depth briefings from Atta on the progress of the plot. He also made travel plans to the United States for some of the 11 September terrorists and facilitated the transfer of money to the 11 September terrorists, including convicted terrorist Zacharias Moussaoui. After learning from Atta in late August 2001 of the date of the hijacking attacks, Bin al-Shibh passed the information to KSM.

- A week before the 11 September attacks, Bin al-Shibh left Germany and arrived in Afghanistan three or four days after the attacks. In late 2001, he fled Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban and began working with KSM in Karachi on follow-on plots against the West, particularly the Heathrow plot. He was tasked by KSM to recruit operatives in Saudi Arabia for an attack on Heathrow Airport, and, as of his capture, Bin al-Shibh had identified four operatives for the operation.

NAME	Zubair
PHONETICS	zoo-BEAR
KEY ALIAS(ES)	Mohd Farik bin Amin (true name), Zaid
AFFILIATION(S)	Jemaah Islamiya and al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Malaysian

Al-Qa'ida and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) member Mohd Farik Bin Amin—best known as Zubair—served directly under JI operational planner Hambali. As one of Hambali's trusted associates, Zubair assisted in Hambali's operations, which included casing targets for JI planned attacks, until his capture in 2003. Hambali in November 2001 tapped Zubair to be a suicide operative for an al-Qa'ida attack targeting Los Angeles. Zubair played a role in transferring funds used to finance terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia from al-Qa'ida operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad to Hambali. Zubair received small arms and combat tactics training at al-Qa'ida's al-Faruq Camp in Afghanistan in 2000 and again in 2001. While earning his degree in electronics telecommunications in Malaysia, Zubair met fellow student Bashir Bin Lap (a.k.a. Lillie), who also later became one of Hambali's lieutenants and was captured with Hambali in 2003.

NAME	Walid Bin 'Attash
PHONETICS	wah-LEED bin AH-tush
KEY ALIASES	Khallad Bin 'Attash, Silver
AFFILIATION	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Yemeni, born and raised in Saudi Arabia

Walid Bin 'Attash, best known as Khallad, was a key al-Qa'ida operative from 1998 until his capture in 2003. Khallad, who is 27, is the scion of a prominent terrorist family: his father, Muhammad, was close to Usama Bin Ladin, and several of Khallad's brothers went to Afghanistan to train and fight in the 1990s; two of these brothers were killed—including one during US airstrikes in Afghanistan in late 2001—and another, Hassan, has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004.

Khallad arrived in Afghanistan in about 1995 and trained at a number of camps. In 1996, after Bin Ladin's return to Afghanistan from Sudan, Khallad alternated between serving as a bodyguard for the al-Qa'ida leader and participating in combat against the Northern Alliance; he lost his right leg during a battlefield accident in 1997. In 1998, Bin Ladin began using Khallad operationally, first as the al-Qa'ida leader's intermediary to al-Qa'ida Arabian Peninsula network chief 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri; together during 1998 and 1999, Khallad and Nashiri worked together on the maritime plot that culminated in the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000. In early 1999, Bin Ladin reportedly selected him to become a hijacker in the operation on 11 September 2001, but he was arrested in Yemen in April of that year while attempting to obtain a US visa because local authorities suspected he was a different extremist. Although his brief imprisonment blocked his travel to the United States, Khallad otherwise assisted in the operation, including helping Bin Ladin select additional hijackers and traveling to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok during December 1999-January 2000 to meet with hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar and to take two flights on a US-flagged airliner to assess in-flight security procedures.

- In late 1999, Bin Ladin asked him to help select about two-dozen experienced and reliable operatives for special training at the Mes Ainak camp in Afghanistan; Khallad supervised the training at the camp; many of these operatives went on to participate in prominent operations: one became a suicide bomber in the Cole operation; two were later 11 September hijackers; another was a cell leader who was killed during the suicide bombings in Riyadh in May 2003; and yet another gained renown for his involvement in the bombing of the Limburg in October 2002 and for his plot to assassinate the US Ambassador to Yemen.

After the attacks on 11 September, Khallad helped prepare al-Qa'ida's defenses around Tora Bora, then fled Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban in late 2001. In early January 2002, Khallad arrived in Karachi, where he served as a communications link between al-Qa'ida's senior leadership and the network in Saudi Arabia—particularly after the detention of al-Nashiri in late 2002—and assisted in the movement of operatives from South and Southeast Asia to the Arabian Peninsula. He also aided efforts by Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) to recruit Saudi hijackers for the al-Qa'ida plot to hijack airliners to attack Heathrow Airport.

- In the months before his arrest, Khallad and KSM's nephew 'Ammar al-Baluchi were organizing a plot to carry out simultaneous attacks in Karachi against the US Consulate, Western travelers at the airport, and Westerners residing in the Karachi area. The plot was close to execution when he was detained.

NAME	Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
PHONETICS	HAH-lid SHAKE moo-HAH-mud
KEY ALIAS	Mukhtar
AFFILIATION	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Baluchi born and raised in Kuwait

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) is one of history's most infamous terrorists, and his capture in 2003 deprived al-Qa'ida of one of its most capable senior operatives. He devoted most of his adult life to terrorist plotting, specifically against the United States, and was the driving force behind the attacks on 11 September 2001 as well as several subsequent plots against US and Western targets worldwide.

After graduating from North Carolina A&T State University in 1986 with a degree in mechanical engineering, KSM traveled to Afghanistan to participate in the anti-Soviet fighting there. KSM joined Yousef in the Philippines in 1994 to plan the "Bojinka" plot—the simultaneous bombings of a dozen US-flagged commercial airliners over the Pacific. After the plot was disrupted and Yousef was caught in early 1995, KSM was indicted for his role in the plot and went into hiding. By 1999, he convinced Usama Bin Ladin to provide him with operatives and funding for a new airliner plot, which culminated in the attacks on 11 September two years later.

- KSM headed al-Qa'ida's Media Committee from 2000 and he helped build close operational ties between al-Qa'ida and the Jemaah Islamiya (JI) terrorist group that was plotting against US and Israeli targets in Southeast Asia.

By late 2001, with the collapse of the Taliban regime and the dispersal of al-Qa'ida's leadership, the prestige associated with engineering the attacks on 11 September propelled KSM into the role of external operations chief for al-Qa'ida.

- In addition to plots targeting Britain, KSM launched several plots targeting the US Homeland, including a plot in late 2001 to have JI suicide operatives hijack a plane over the Pacific and crash it into a skyscraper on the US West Coast; a plan in early 2002 to send al-Qa'ida operatives to conduct attacks in the U.S.; and a plot in early 2003 to employ a network of Pakistanis—including Majid Khan—to smuggle explosives into New York and to target gas stations, railroad tracks, and a bridge in New York.

NAME	Gouled Hassan Dourad
PHONETICS	Goo-LED HAH-san Door-AHD
KEY ALIAS(ES)	Guleed Hassan Ahmad, Hanad
AFFILIATION(S)	al-Qa'ida, al-Itihad al-Islami
NATIONALITY	Somali

Gouled Hassan Dourad was the head of a Mogadishu-based facilitation network of al-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI) members that supported al-Qa'ida members in Somalia. Gouled was a member of a small, selective group of AIAI members who worked for the East African al-Qa'ida cell led by Abu Talha al-Sudani—Gouled's responsibilities included locating safehouses, assisting in the transfer of funds, and procuring weapons, explosives, and other supplies.

- Reporting suggests that Gouled carried out one operational mission for Abu Talha: during September–October 2003, he cased the US military base in Djibouti—Camp Lemonier—as part of Abu Talha's plot to conduct a suicide truck-bombing attack. He also was tasked by Abu Talha to purchase two rocket-propelled grenades, five AK-47 assault rifles and four 9mm pistols, which he delivered to Abu Talha in mid-2003.
- Gouled was privy to several terrorist plots under consideration by his AIAI cell, including shooting down an Ethiopian jetliner landing at an airport in Somalia in 2003 and kidnapping Western workers of nongovernmental organizations in Hargeysa, Somalia, in 2002 as a means to raise money for future AIAI operations. Following Gouled's arrest, AIAI terrorists on 19 March 2004 tried unsuccessfully to kidnap a German aid worker and murdered a Kenyan contract employee in Hargeysa.

Gouled was born in Mogadishu in 1974; when the Somali civil war erupted in 1991, his parents sent him to Germany, where he lived in a refugee camp. He traveled to Sweden and gained asylum there in 1993. In 1994, he attempted travel to the United States but was turned back in Iceland because of his fraudulent passport.

- While in Sweden, Gouled attended a Somali mosque, whose imam arranged for Gouled and his friend, future AIAI bombmaker Qasim Mohamed, to train in Afghanistan before joining the Somali war effort. Gouled trained at Khaldan camp in weapons and explosives from January through October 1996 and at another camp in Khowst in assassination techniques for several months. By late 1996, he returned to Somalia.

Gouled became a member of AIAI in 1997 out of a commitment to support the Somali war against Ethiopia and to win the Ogaden region of Ethiopia back for Somalia. He fought against the Ethiopians in Ogaden off and on from 1997 to 2002 and trained AIAI fighters. He allegedly became associated with al-Qa'ida because its members were in Somalia and his AIAI cell supported al-Qa'ida.

- Gouled was introduced to Abu Talha al-Sudani—who came to Mogadishu to hide following the Mombasa attacks in November 2002—in early 2003 by his AIAI cell leader. Gouled was recruited to work for Abu Talha, in part, because he had trained in Afghanistan; spoke Arabic, English, some Swedish, and Somali; and had a high-school education.


Mission

Joint Task Force Guantanamo

Safe, Humane, Legal, Transparent



JTF Guantanamo conducts safe, humane, legal and transparent care and custody of detainees, including those convicted by military commission and those ordered released. We conduct intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination for the protection of detainees and personnel working in JTF Guantanamo facilities and in support of the Global War on Terror. We provide support to the Office of Military Commissions and support law enforcement and war crimes investigations.



In 2008, 374 news media representatives from 300 media outlets were supported by JTF Guantanamo and reported from here. More than 2,700 news media representatives have visited here since January, 2002.

2008 habeas visits: 1,326
2008 Commissions visits: 544
TOTAL 2008 LEGAL VISITS: 1,870

2007 habeas visits: 1,111
2007 Commissions visits: 188
TOTAL 2007 LEGAL VISITS: 1,299

The JTF is comprised of approximately 2,000 personnel

- Military Service Members
- Government Employees
- Civilian Contractors

Joint Task Force Commander:

Rear Admiral Thomas H. Copeman III, U.S. Navy

Joint Task Force Deputy Commander:

Brigadier General Rafael O'Ferrall, Puerto Rico Army National Guard

Joint Task Force Components:

- Headquarters Element
- Joint Detention Group
- Joint Intelligence Group
- Joint Medical Group
- JTF Maritime Security Group

Joint Task Force Partners:

- Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC) focuses on:
 - ♦ Conduct Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and Administrative Review Boards (ARBs) as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Office of Military Commissions (OMC) focuses on:
 - ♦ War Crime Commission Proceedings
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) focuses on:
 - ♦ Counter-terrorism linked to homeland defense, war crimes investigations
- Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) focuses on:
 - ♦ War crime investigations
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) focuses on:
 - ♦ Mapping and Imagery
- Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) focuses on:
 - ♦ National level all-source intelligence analysis for the United States Government

Timeline

Joint Task Force Guantanamo

Safe, Humane, Legal, Transparent



Prior to Joint Task Force Guantanamo

1992: Operation Sea Signal established to prepare for a mass migration of refugees from Haiti and Cuba.

1994: Operation Sea Signal led to the creation of Joint Task Force 160.

- Responsible for housing and processing more than 40,000 migrants awaiting repatriation or parole to the United States.
- Camp X-Ray established to segregate migrants who had committed crimes such as theft, assault and battery, prostitution and black-market activities from other migrants and from U.S. civilians and military service members at Guantanamo.

1996: Operation Sea Signal comes to an end.

- Camp X-Ray abandoned.

2001 September: World Trade Center, Pentagon and United Flight 93 Terrorist Attacks.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo

2001 December: Joint Task Force 160 reactivated.

- Camp X-Ray prepared as a temporary location for detention operations.
- Camp X-Ray was the only pre-existing facility that had the capability of serving as a detention center.

2002 January: The first detainees are brought to Guantanamo Bay and housed in Camp X-Ray.

- The International Committee of the Red Cross makes its first visit six days later.
- ICRC continues quarterly visits to present.

2002 February: Joint Task Force 170 is created as the intelligence task force to work side by side with Joint Task Force 160.

2002 April: Construction of the new 410-bed Camp Delta (Camps 1, 2, 3) is completed.

2002 April: Detainees are moved from Camp X-Ray to Camp Delta, a more permanent detention center.

2002 November: Joint Task Force 160 and 170 merged to create the Joint Task Force Guantanamo that exists today.

2003 February: Opening of Camp 4.

- Provides communal living to allow compliant detainees broader freedoms.

2004 May: Opening of Camp 5.

- First modern state-of-the-art facility.

2004 August: Camp Echo complete.

- Currently used as a legal visitation center.

2006 October: Camp Iguana occupied.

- Provides communal living designated for Court Ordered Release detainees.

2006 October: Camp 6 construction complete.

- A maximum security facility modeled after others in the United States.

2006 October: Camp 7 occupied.

- A facility for high value detainees.

2006 December: Opening of Camp 6.

2008 March: Expeditionary Legal Complex completed.

2009 January: Executive order to close JTF Guantanamo is signed by President Barack Obama.

2009 June: Rear Adm. Thomas H. Copeman III becomes Commander, JTF Guantanamo.

Detainees

Joint Task Force Guantanamo

Safe, Humane, Legal, Transparent



The Joint Detention Group conducts safe, humane, legal and transparent care and custody of detainees, including those convicted by military commissions and those ordered released.

The current detainee population is approximately 230 and represents about 30 countries and languages. The age ranges from 22 to 61, with an average age of 35. More than 520 detainees have been transferred or released.

Detainee meals meet their cultural and dietary needs and cost approximately \$3 million per year. Each detainee receives 6,500-6,800 calories per day and have six menus to choose from. Feast meals are served two times per week.

For worship, prayer time is observed five times daily. Korans are provided in all represented native languages; other religious materials (prayer beads, rugs, etc.) are provided to all detainees.

Religious holidays are observed; camp daily operations schedules shift during Ramadan.

Compliant Detainees are allowed four to 20 hours of outdoor recreation daily. They have contact with other detainees, receive mail regularly and have access to more than 14,000 books, magazines and DVDs in 18 languages from the detainee library.



Camp Delta:

Camps 1-3; operational 2002

- Camp capacity: 720
- Open air, steel mesh single cells
- Exercise areas, cultural style facilities

Camp 4 (highly compliant); operational 2003

- Camp capacity: 160
- Communal living areas, climate controlled, Western-style facilities
- Movies, satellite TV and language and art classes
- Exercise & recreation areas, soccer field, basketball court.

Camp 5 (maximum security); operational 2004

- Camp capacity: 100
- State-of-the-art facility with automated control center
- Climate-controlled building, single cells, Western-style facilities
- Individual exercise areas that can be converted to dual recreation yards for communal recreation

Camp 6 (built as medium security); operational 2006

- Camp capacity: 176
- Converted to maximum security facility on-site
- State-of-the-art facility with automated control center
- Climate-controlled building, single cells, Western-style facilities
- Individual and communal exercise areas

Camp 7; operational 2006

- Camp Capacity: 36
- Detention facility for high value detainees

Camp Iguana; operational 2008

- Camp Capacity: 20
- Communal facility for detainees designated as Court Ordered Releases.

Camp Echo; operational 2004

- Camp Capacity: 22
- Legal visitation facility


Guard Force

Joint Task Force Guantanamo

Safe, Humane, Legal, Transparent



There are approximately 1,100 personnel assigned to the Joint Detention Group (JDG). The guard force within the JDG consists of both Army and Navy personnel. Guards range in age between 19 and 25 with an average age of 23 years old.



The guard force, which is distributed throughout all nine camps, conducts detainee checks a minimum of every three minutes. Every detainee meal is hand served by the guard force. For each intra-camp detainee movement two guards are required, while four guards are required for inter-camp movements. Detainees are under observation at all times, including humanities programs, recreation and all appointments.

Guards receive pre-deployment training before arriving to ensure they are professionally trained to all standards and requirements. A mock facility was created at Fort Lewis, Wash., to train all Navy guards. In addition to pre-deployment training, right seat/left seat training is conducted upon arrival to Joint Task Force Guantanamo. JDG guards work 12-hour shifts with a four on - two off schedule. They are deployed here for one year. Clear standard operating procedures are strictly adhered

to at all times. In addition, standardization teams conduct internal audits to ensure procedures are followed. There is daily, active, on-site supervision by the chain of command.

Detainee assaults on the guard force occur on a daily basis. Guards that are assaulted, both verbally and physically, are given time to clean up and then are evaluated and given the opportunity to go home or continue their watch. The guards are given the opportunity to leave their shift or talk to someone from the Joint Stress Mitigation and Restoration Team (JSMART). Most choose to clean up, change and resume their shift at work.

There are many support elements that contribute to the JDG mission, including:

- Behavioral Science Consultant Team
- JSMART
- Linguist
- Staff Judge Advocate
- Cultural Advisor

Behavioral Science Consultants (BSCs) are psychologists not assigned to clinical practice functions but to provide consultative services to support authorized law detention and intelligence activities. They are analogous to behavioral science unit personnel of a law enforcement organization or forensic psychiatry or psychology personnel supporting the criminal justice, parole or corrections systems. BSCs employ their professional training, not in a provider-patient relationship, but in relation to a person who is the subject of a lawful governmental inquiry, assessment, investigation, adjudication or other proper action.

JSMART, under the Joint Medical Group, conducts outreach and preventive services for all Joint Task Force personnel.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo

Safe, Humane, Legal, Transparent



U.S. Military Code of Conduct

Military Code of Conduct – Consists of six articles and provides guidance on how to conduct ourselves, including if captured. While U.S. service members look to the Code of Conduct for guidance when captured, al-Qaeda terrorists follow the manual referred to as the Manchester Document.

- **I am an American**, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.
- **I will never surrender** of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.
- **If I am captured**, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.
- **If I become a prisoner of war**, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. **If I am senior**, I will take command. If not, **I will obey the lawful orders** of those appointed over me, and will back them up in every way.
- When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give only name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.
- I will never forget that I am an American, fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

The Manchester Document

Manchester Document – The terrorist training manual found in the apartment of a suspected al Qaeda member in Manchester, England in May 2000. Below are some excerpts from the manual:

- The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates... Platonic ideals...nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.
- Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they (always) have been...by pen and gun...by word and bullet...by tongue and teeth.

Prison and Detention Centers Chapter – This chapter of the manual gives guidance on how to specifically respond to conditions of detention:

- **About trial** - "...once more the brothers must insist on proving that torture was inflicted on them... before the judge."
- **About hunger strikes** - "it is possible to resort to a hunger strike, but it is a tactic that can either succeed or fail."
- **During the trial** - "...the court has to be notified of any mistreatment of the brothers inside the prison."
- **About visits** - "Take advantage of visits to communicate with brothers outside prison and exchange information that may be helpful to them in their work outside prison...the importance of mastering the art of hiding messages is self-evident here."
- **On Gathering Information** - "Information benefits the organization's command by providing information about the enemy's strengths and weaknesses...movements of the enemy and his members."



Medical

Joint Task Force Guantanamo

Safe, Humane, Legal, Transparent



The Joint Medical Group (JMG) conducts humane care of detainees. Equivalent healthcare is provided to detainees and Joint Task Force Troopers.

The medical care provided to detainees at Guantanamo is on the same level as U.S. service members receive. JMG providers are on-call to provide care to all detainees regardless of disciplinary status, level of cooperation or legal status. The JMG operations are completely independent of Joint Detention Group and Joint Intelligence Group operations.

Detainees are treated at a dedicated medical facility with state-of-the-art equipment and an expert medical staff. The medical facility is equipped with 17 inpatient beds (expandable to 30), a physical-therapy area, pharmacy, radiology department, optometry exam area, dental treatment area, central sterilization area and an operating room. Most routine medical care is administered by Navy corpsmen who visit each cellblock daily and upon the request of any detainee for care. In addition to providing routine medical care, the hospital staff has treated detainees for wounds sustained prior to detention and other pre-existing medical conditions (often unknown to the detainees before their medical treatment at Guantanamo). More serious medical conditions can be treated at the Naval Base Hospital. Additional specialists are available to provide care at Guantanamo for any medical needs that exceed the capabilities of the Naval Base Hospital.

In addition to the detention hospital, there is a separate facility for dedicated mental health care. The medical staff conducts approximately 7,800 visits annually, including preventive mental health screenings. Mental health care also is available for detainees who request it.

Detainees at GTMO have received immunizations, which most would not have had available to them in their home countries. Some detainees have been provided life-changing care such as receiving prosthetic limbs or having cataracts removed.

- Medical services are available to detainees 24 hours a day, seven days a week
- All medical services are provided only with the consent of the detainee, with few exceptions
- Detainee/healthcare ratio: 1 medical staff for every 2 detainees; 1 licensed provider for approximately 57 detainees (compare to U.S. national average of 1 primary care provider for every 390 citizens or in Afghanistan 1:5,300)
- Medications dispensed annually: 155,000
- Sick call visits annually: 3,500
- Provider appointments/visits annually: 1,400
- Vaccinations provided annually: 390
- Tuberculosis (TB) screening conducted via Quantiferon testing – the most accurate TB testing method available
- Age-appropriate colon cancer screening: 25 colonoscopies
- Annual dental procedures: 400 (to include cleanings, fillings, root canals and oral surgeries)
- Annual eye examinations: approximately 35
- Annual physical therapy consults: 125
- Behavioral health services: Less than 8% of detainees have an active diagnosis of a psychiatric illness. Inpatient and outpatient care available.
- Prosthetic devices: Issued to eight detainees, visits by the prosthetist quarterly
- Available specialty care: cardiology, ENT, gastroenterology, neurology, radiology, urology, dermatology.

